WILL ROBOTS TAKE
YOUR JOB? A LOOK AT
VIRGINIA’S
OPPORTUNITIES AND
VULNERABILITIES
It’s not about the skill level or how much
education you have. Really, the primary
question is, is the job on some level routine,
repetitive and predictable?
– Martin Ford, “Rise of the Robots”
(Basic Books, 2015)
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t’s not often that a study generated by two
Oxford academics creates as much hubbub
as did a 2013 examination that focused on

which U.S. occupations are at “high risk” of
being automated within the next 20 years. Carl
Benedikt Frey, an economist, and Michael A.
Osborne, an engineer, led the Oxford automation
study,1 which concluded that 47 percent of

total employment in 702 occupations in the
United States should be considered to be in the
“high risk” category relative to the potential of
automation to destroy these jobs. “Automation”
here refers broadly to the substitution by
employers of machines, software-guided
processes and artificial intelligence (AI) for
workers.
Virtually everyone knows about mechanical
dishwashers replacing human dishwashers and
one can easily visualize a single giant combine
harvester replacing dozens of farmworkers
wielding scythes. Less obvious perhaps has been
the accelerating automation of the financial
services industry, where giants such as Goldman
Sachs are using software programs instead
of highly paid associates to conduct and write
research, make stock trades, summarize relevant
news and even communicate with customers.
Contemplate also the use of sensors rather than
people to pick out microcircuits or even heads of

Data presented in this chapter relate either to the U.S. or Virginia.

lettuce that are of inferior quality and therefore

What about Virginia metropolitan regions such as Richmond and

should be discarded. Or, consider that a computer

Roanoke? Bureau of Labor Statistics occupational data that focus

now can defeat the best human chess player and

on mid-sized regions are much more variable than statewide data

an AI program developed by Google “learned” on
1 C
 arl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne, “The Future of Employment:
How Susceptible Are Jobs to Automation?” Oxford Martin School, Sept.
17, 2013. www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_
Employment.pdf.

and, in some cases, simply not available. Presentation of these data
might lead to unjustified conclusions. Hence, we do not offer any
regional data, though some are available.
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complex 2,500-year-old strategy game.

The Common Denominator

An increasing number of McDonald’s restaurants now have computer

What determines whether the jobs of workers in some occupations (say,

its own how to beat the reigning world champion at Go, the exceedingly

screens that take your order – rendering unnecessary some of the
workers formerly behind the counter. No minimum-wage law applies
to the computer screens. In the realm of higher education, the advent
of new distance-learning tools and the rise of “MOOCs” (massive open
online courses) are disrupting the centuries-old “sage on the stage” model
that emphasizes professors lecturing to groups of more or less interested
students arrayed in front of them.

secretaries and legal researchers) are at high risk, while the jobs of
workers in other occupations (nurses and plumbers) are not? The key is
not necessarily the level of education required for each job, though this
may play a role. Instead, the overriding deciding factor is the extent
to which jobs require creative and social intelligence, perception,
interpretation and the ability to manipulate as opposed to being
dominated by repetitive, routine tasks capable of being learned by
machines fueled by artificial intelligence.

Highest on the risk list are occupations that include telemarketers,
tax preparers, library technicians, etchers and engravers, and bank
tellers. Frey and Osborne argue that up to 87 percent of jobs in the
accommodation and food services sector are at risk, as are up to 54
percent of jobs in finance and insurance. Lowest on their risk list are
occupations such as elementary school teachers, doctors and dentists,

Some analysts believe that Frey and Osborne’s estimates are
substantially too high. A 2016 Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) study takes issue with their methodology

nurses, many health care workers, plumbers, theatrical makeup artists

and argues that it isn’t all workers in an occupation that are at risk, but

and foresters.

rather specific jobs within occupations. Thus, some workers at financial
firms can readily be supplanted by trading algorithms incorporated
into software, while others cannot be replaced because of their
personal relationships with specific firms and customers. The OECD
study concludes that only 9 percent of all jobs are at risk because of
automation (Melanie Arntz, Terry Gregory and Ulrich Zierahn, “The Risk
of Automation for Jobs in OECD Countries,” www.oecd-ilibrary.org, May
2016). A July 2016 study produced by McKinsey analysts Michael Chui,
James Manyika and Mehdi Miremadi (“Where Machines Could Replace
Humans — and Where They Can’t (Yet),” www.mckinsey.com/businessfunctions/business-technology/our-insights/where-machines-couldreplace-humans-and-where-they-cant-yet?cid=other-eml-alt-mkq-mckoth-1607), concluded that 60 percent of all occupations in the United
States could see 30 percent or more of their work activities being
automated.
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Note that job recovery in the United States (and Virginia) from the

The principle is straightforward: Repetitive, predictable tasks are

Great Recession of 2008 has been built upon relatively low-skill service

susceptible to machine learning and the application of artificial

jobs that pay relatively low wages. It is often these jobs that Frey and

intelligence. Thus, college professors, despite their Ph.Ds., may indeed

Osborne argue are most at risk because of automation. The reason is

find some of their number being replaced by learner-driven technology

that they involve repetitive tasks that can be programmed into a machine

that is capable of doing what they do, but at a reduced cost. Ironically,

or computer. Further, the machine frequently can complete those tasks

the learner-driven technologies with access to abundant data and feedback

with a higher level of quality and do so at a lower per-unit cost than their

may actually be more sensitive than the typical college professor is to

human counterpart. Think about the computer screen that is taking the

the peculiar geographic locations, job and family situations, and learning

place of behind-the-counter personnel at Panera Bread.

preferences of individual students.

The reality is that computerization of jobs no longer is confined to

Contrast college professors to elementary school teachers, very few of

traditional assembly-line, mass-production industries. However, it

whom hold a doctorate. These teachers cannot be replaced by a machine

also is true that some manual labor tasks require physical adaptability

because of their need to exercise judgment, interpret what is going

and flexibility in approach. Hence, workers doing these tasks are more

on in their sometimes unpredictable classrooms, develop individually

resistant to automation than those in other jobs that often require more

focused plans of action on the fly, and use their social skills to deal with

education, but nevertheless can be imitated by “smart” machines.

impressionable and sometimes delicate young people. Elementary school

It is the exercise of reasoning, judgment and creative abilities plus the

teachers are among the least at-risk workers in society today.

application of social interaction skills that most frequently cause a job to
fall into the low automation risk category rather than high risk. One does
not need a bachelor’s degree to become an electrician or a plumber (both
low-risk occupations). Nevertheless, electricians, automobile mechanics
and plumbers must be able to assess, interpret, adjust, reason and create
when inserted into unpredictable situations. “You never know what kinds
of wiring and connections you’re going to find in an old house,” a veteran
electrician told us. Some variant of this observation, however, might be
applied to nurses, engineers and multimedia artists. On-the-job experience
often assumes great value in such positions because it provides workers
with a set of proficiencies that enables them to exercise sound judgment in
situations that seldom are repetitive.
On the other hand, the tasks confronting a telephone operator, shipping
clerk or Las Vegas gaming employee tend to be repetitive and frequently
can be replaced by a smart machine. True, these jobs usually require less
formal education than those in low-risk occupations. However, it is not

What The Studies Say
(And Do Not Say)
Neither Frey and Osborne, nor the OECD or McKinsey Global
Institute, are rigid determinists. They speak in terms of probabilities
(“susceptibilities”) rather than certainties. The future they paint is a
plausible one, yet not one that is inevitable. Why? Because technological
change and changing prices may alter the world they have addressed.
Consider the following situations.
• Think of a new machine that is capable of performing many of the tasks
of a software engineer; however, this machine is prohibitively expensive
and hence what is feasible is not economic.
• Further, even when a machine is capable of performing a task

education per se that makes the difference here, but rather the presence

inexpensively, there may be a visible gap between the machine doing that

or absence of repetitive tasks, reasoning and creativity.

task inexpensively and doing it well. Consider automated checkout lines
at supermarkets and automated check-in lines at airports. Intelligent
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machine innovations such as these reduce supplier costs, but clearly can

mobility. It seems likely, therefore, that the impact of automation will be

be the source of customer frustration and delays.

felt unevenly across income classes.

• The use of “big data” has the potential to diminish the need for human

• The analysts do not directly discuss current proposals, such as a $15

judgment and interpretation that currently cause some jobs to be

per hour minimum wage, but economic analysis predicts that such a

resistant to automation. A range of cognitive tasks could be susceptible

law would provide an additional incentive for employers to accelerate

to machine learning and recognition if their development is based upon

the adoption of laborsaving automation. The salient questions are

large data sets that are capable of recognizing patterns and therefore

whether the nature of their production processes, their specific collective

can capture the key aspects of human choice and behavior. Just as big

bargaining agreements and the law actually give them the flexibility

data enable Amazon to suggest books that customers might like based

to do so. The answers clearly differ across industries and even inside

on their internet behavior, these data sets also might inform activities

industries.

ranging from selling automobiles, houses and tickets to serving legal
clients and responding to calls for law enforcement.
• None of the studies directly addresses the distinction that some

None of the analysts should be regarded as champions of the world they
foresee. They are impartial reporters of the facts as they view them. Still,
they note that the demise of high-risk jobs will increase unemployment

economists currently make between “tradable” versus “non-tradable”

at least in the short run and likely increase economic inequality as well

goods. Tradable goods are those that are sold internationally in

unless society provides financial incentives and invests in job retraining

competitive markets, for example, cellphones. In tradable markets,

programs designed to ease the flow of people from the high-risk

automobile workers in one country (say, the U.S.) can lose their jobs

occupations where jobs are being lost, to low-risk occupations where

to automobile workers in another country (say, China) because of

the number of jobs is increasing. Of course, this may be easier said than

international competition. By contrast, goods and services in non-

done. How does one teach creative and social skills, how to interpret and

tradable markets are not subject to international competition. A

make judgments, and how to adjust to the unexpected to people who may

hairstylist in Harrisonburg isn’t in competition with a hairstylist in

have lower than average intellectual abilities and who for decades have

Beijing. Even so, things can change. Consider that tax preparation used

been performing repetitive tasks? How does one convince an unemployed

to be a predominantly local industry – relatively few customers went

steelworker with a family and a mortgage that he or she should move

outside of their hometowns to get their tax returns completed. However,

from West Virginia to Texas? Frey and Osborne are straightforward: “For

because of automation, a tax preparer in Danville now can lose her job

workers to win the race, however, they will have to acquire creative and

to tax preparers in New York City or Beijing who are using software

social skills.” This is important advice, given that McKinsey suggested in

and internet connections that enable them to prepare tax returns

2013 that sophisticated algorithms could substitute for approximately 140

for residents in Southwest Virginia. The point is easily understood:

million full-time knowledge workers worldwide.2

Automation converts some goods and services from tradable to nontradable and this can result in the loss or shuffling of jobs. This trend is
likely to continue as software driven by artificial intelligence makes it
possible for items such as tax forms to be completed anywhere.
• Frey and Osborne point out that many of the people who will lose their
jobs as a result of automation are among those in society least able to
cope with such disruptions due to background, education and lack of
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The National Picture
For the United States as a whole, Frey and Osborne estimate that 47
percent of all nonfarm jobs fall into their “high risk” category in terms
of being eliminated because of automation. In April 2016, this would have
translated to 67.64 million nonfarm jobs – a staggering number.3 However,
even if Frey and Osborne’s estimates are precisely on the mark, it does
not follow that these losses will occur immediately. Multiple decades
sometimes are required for industries to adjust to new realities. Witness
the slow deterioration of output levels and jobs in the coal, textile and
tobacco industries in Virginia.

Where physical work is concerned, it is the predictability of the motions
involved with that work that is the key to the susceptibility of a particular
occupation to automation. McKinsey concluded that 78 percent of jobs
involving predictable physical work (welding, food preparation and
packaging of products) are prone to be automated, whereas only 25
percent of jobs involving less predictable physical work (construction,
forestry and raising outdoor animals) are vulnerable. Using the same
analysis, McKinsey concluded that 47 percent of a retail salesperson’s
activities have the technical potential to be automated, but fully 86 percent
of the jobs of the retail sector’s bookkeepers, accountants and auditing
clerks are in jeopardy. McKinsey reported these estimates in detail in a
2015 study.4 The consulting group concluded that 45 percent of all work

Graph 1 reports the five broad occupational categories that Frey and

activities could be automated using already available technologies, but only

Osborne estimated have the greatest vulnerability to job losses because

5 percent of all occupations (the Frey and Osborne focus indicator).

of technological change, plus the five broad occupations with the least
susceptibility.

The McKinsey analysts also estimated that more than 20 percent of a
typical CEO’s working time could be automated using currently available

The McKinsey study approaches the job vulnerability question through a

technologies. The analysts concluded that several lower-paid occupations,

somewhat different lens by focusing on 2,000 different work activities in

such as health aides, landscapers and maintenance workers, faced fewer

more than 800 occupations. Similar to the OECD, McKinsey argues that

risks associated with automation because the work of the individuals in

individual occupations are distinctive in requiring a variety of different

these occupations could not easily be replaced by a machine or replicated

work activities, which might include physical movement, processing

by means of AI.

data, interacting with customers and the like. These work activities have
varying potential for automation. The McKinsey study provides estimates
of the portion of time during each workweek that a typical worker spends
on each specific work activity. Graph 2 reports the estimates of the
percentage of time during a typical workweek that workers in the United
States spend on various work activities. From left to right, these range
from the work activities least susceptible to automation (such as managing
others) to those most susceptible to automation (predictable physical
work).

The consulting group found that the amount of workers’ average hourly
wages explained only 19 percent of the variability in their automation
susceptibility. That is, it was the characteristics of specific work tasks
rather than the monetary value of that work that was the most important
determinant of whether or not those work tasks were vulnerable to
automation. High salaries did not guarantee reduced susceptibility to
automation. Indeed, the opposite may be true – high salaries increase the
incentive for employers to seek ways to automate.

Miles Brundage of Slate asks an interesting question: In the future,
will “made by humans” become a phrase equivalent to “organic” or
“fair trade”? www.slate.com (Sept. 27, 2013)
3 This is a seasonally adjusted number and includes government employees.

4 Michael Chui, James Manyika and Mehdi Miremadi, “Four Fundamentals of Workplace Automation,”
www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/business-technology/our-insights/four-fundamentals-of-workplaceautomation (November 2015).
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GRAPH 1
Graph 1
THE BROAD OCCUPATIONS MOST (LEAST) SUSCEPTIBLE TO AUTOMATION:
The Broad Occupations Most (Least) Susceptible to Automation:
PERCENT OF JOBS IN FREY AND OSBORNE’S “HIGH RISK” CATEGORY
Percent of Jobs in Frey and Osborne’s “High Risk” Category
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Source: Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne, “The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?” Oxford University Martin School, Sept. 17, 2013
Source: Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne, “The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?” Oxford University Martin School, Sept. 17, 2013
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The Virginia Picture
Frey and Osborne examined 702 specific occupations as defined by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics and ultimately assigned a probability to each
occupation that is their estimate of the susceptibility of the jobs in that
occupation to disappearing because of automation. Let’s begin our analysis
by applying their technique to 22 broad occupational labor force segments
in Virginia. Table 1 supplies these data, which apply to 3,682,470 Virginia
nonfarm workers in 2015 in the Commonwealth.
It is evident in Table 1 that Frey and Osborne’s methodology suggests
that 1,877,540 jobs in Virginia are susceptible to automation whereby
a machine, software or artificial intelligence replaces the worker. This
is 51 percent of all Virginia jobs (compared to the national average of
47 percent) and these jobs account for $70.56 billion in annual wages.
Note that Virginia’s total employment roster is slightly more vulnerable
to technological change than is true for the United States. This implies
that Virginia’s workforce has a lower percentage of workers performing
nonrepetitive tasks that require judgment and on-the-job flexibility.
That one’s job is susceptible to being lost to technological change does not
mean that this actually will occur. Not all employers choose to automate,
or to do it in the same ways. Further, some work tasks that appear to
be highly repetitive sometimes turn out not to be so at crucial decision
points in the work process and therefore resist “pattern recognition” – the
application of artificial intelligence in a manner that adequately imitates
what a human being would do in a specific situation. A manufacturing
robot, for example, might be superb at detecting minute differences in
the size and weight of items being produced, but nevertheless be unable
to detect emerging differences in smell or color. Human participation and
intervention still are required in some situations.
Frey and Osborne are not inerrant savants who can see around
corners and neither are we. They note that “making predictions about

to food preparation absolutely are going to be lost in Virginia. Additionally,
as noted previously, even if these job losses do occur, decades may be
required for this to happen.
In general, we can see in Table 1 that there is a tendency for the
negative job impacts of technological change to land most heavily on
the least-educated members of the labor force – but only if their jobs
involve the repetitive, absence of judgment characteristics mentioned
previously. The key to surviving automation is not worker education,
per se, but instead job characteristics involving varied tasks that
require workers to make judgment calls, on occasion to use their
intuition and in some cases to work together as a team.
Note that if the OECD study referenced earlier is correct, then the
number of Virginia jobs at risk is not 1,877,540, but rather only 327,822 –
still a large number, but one that would be much more manageable. The
OECD critique of Frey and Osborne’s work focuses on the variability in
the occupational circumstances and conditions the OECD believes exist
inside the 702 occupations that Frey and Osborne analyze. This variability,
the OECD argues, means that it often is inappropriate to include all jobs
in an occupation in a category labeled “at risk.”
No doubt some variability in job activities and requirements does
exist inside conventionally labeled occupations; however, 702 distinct
occupations is a large number and separate analysis of each occupation
at this level of detail likely picks up considerable heterogeneity in worker
tasks. Nonetheless, the OECD analysis underlines that the most expansive
estimates of the impact of automation on jobs should be inspected carefully
and probably deflated. Further, even if 47 percent of all jobs in the United
States are at risk because of automation, it does not follow that the loss of
these jobs would occur immediately. Decades might be required for such
an adjustment to occur. The slow, downward employment evolution of the
automobile, coal and steel industries in the United States illustrates the
often-gradual nature of occupational and industrial change.

technological progress is notoriously difficult” and acknowledge that some
occupations will experience future tumult from automation that they
currently do not predict. For example, one should not read the numbers in
Table 1 to mean that it is a certainty that more than 278,000 jobs relating
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TABLE 1
FREY AND OSBORNE’S SUSCEPTIBILITY TO AUTOMATION TECHNIQUE APPLIED TO 22 BROAD JOB CLASSIFICATIONS: VIRGINIA, 2015
BROAD OCCUPATIONAL GROUP

VIRGINIA
TOTAL
EMPLOYMENT

AVERAGE HOURLY
WAGE

AVERAGE
ANNUAL INCOME

TOTAL VIRGINIA
ANNUAL WAGES

PERCENT JOBS
AT RISK

TOTAL JOBS
AT RISK

TOTAL ANNUAL WAGES
AT RISK

Management Occupations

166,610

$ 61.79

$

128,530

$

21,414,383,300

13.10%

21,826

$

2,606,680,168

Business and Financial Operations
Occupations

251,780

$ 39.24

$

81,620

$

20,550,283,600

43.37%

109,197

$

8,561,241,991

Computer and Mathematical
Occupations

195,140

$ 46.52

$

96,750

$

18,879,795,000

13.31%

25,973

$

2,020,223,511

Architecture and Engineering
Occupations

73,790

$ 41.31

$

85,930

$

6,340,774,700

21.15%

15,607

$

985,125,516

Life, Physical and Social Science
Occupations

31,160

$ 39.76

$

82,700

$

2,576,932,000

19.38%

6,039

$

414,754,154

Community and Social Service
Occupations

50,870

$ 22.91

$

47,660

$

2,424,464,200

4.16%

2,116

$

86,907,634

Legal Occupations

36,050

$ 49.75

$

103,480

$

3,730,454,000

27.53%

9,925

$

565,249,295

237,250

$ 25.93

$

53,930

$

12,794,892,500

11.74%

27,853

$

1,051,500,158

48,510

$ 27.51

$

57,220

$

2,775,742,200

17.85%

8,659

$

531,050,098

198,840

$ 36.24

$

75,390

$

14,990,547,600

14.30%

28,434

$

1,366,670,286

Healthcare Support Occupations

85,840

$ 14.00

$

29,120

$

2,499,660,800

23.70%

20,344

$

625,569,235

Protective Service Occupations

99,650

$ 21.41

$

44,530

$

4,437,414,500

44.31%

44,155

$

1,604,686,868

318,730

$ 11.00

$

22,870

$

7,289,355,100

87.47%

278,793

$

6,239,845,855

Education, Training and Library
Occupations
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports
and Media Occupations
Healthcare Practitioners and Technical
Occupations

Food Preparation and Serving Related
Occupations
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TABLE 1
FREY AND OSBORNE’S SUSCEPTIBILITY TO AUTOMATION TECHNIQUE APPLIED TO 22 BROAD JOB CLASSIFICATIONS: VIRGINIA, 2015
BROAD OCCUPATIONAL GROUP

VIRGINIA
TOTAL
EMPLOYMENT

AVERAGE HOURLY
WAGE

AVERAGE
ANNUAL INCOME

TOTAL VIRGINIA
ANNUAL WAGES

PERCENT JOBS
AT RISK

TOTAL JOBS
AT RISK

TOTAL ANNUAL WAGES
AT RISK

Building and Grounds Cleaning and
Maintenance Occupations

124,970

$ 12.21

$

25,400

$

3,174,238,000

74.02%

92,503

$

2,369,839,041

Personal Care and Service Occupations

119,900

$ 12.47

$

25,930

$

3,109,007,000

41.06%

49,231

$

1,057,000,959

Sales and Related Occupations

392,330

$ 18.61

$

38,710

$

15,187,094,300

76.13%

298,681

$

9,298,746,336

Office and Administrative Support
Occupations

549,560

$ 17.58

$

36,570

$

20,097,409,200

76.83%

422,227

$ 14,749,877,695

6,380

$ 15.77

$

32,800

$

209,264,000

41.54%

2,650

$

100,689,765

Construction and Extraction
Occupations

156,160

$ 20.36

$

42,360

$

6,614,937,600

61.58%

96,163

$

3,743,489,693

Installation, Maintenance and Repair
Occupations

144,650

$ 22.65

$

47,110

$

6,814,461,500

56.94%

82,364

$

3,649,015,736

Production Occupations

171,550

$ 17.51

$

36,420

$

6,247,851,000

73.82%

126,638

$

4,328,941,847

Transportation and Material Moving
Occupations

222,750

$ 17.41

$

36,220

$

8,068,005,000

63.05%

108,162

$

4,606,862,311

50.99%

1,877,540

Farming, Fishing and Forestry
Occupations

Totals

3,682,470

$ 190,226,967,100

$ 70,563,968,152

Source: May 2015 Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) data are available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/oes/tables.htm. The May 2015 area level estimates are the first OES estimates to use the 2010
metropolitan statistical area definitions.
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Is Technological Change
(And Job Churning)
Speeding Up?
Is the job-churning process identified by Frey and Osborne going to
accelerate? That is the trillion-dollar question. It’s true that nearly
everywhere we look, there is evidence of technological change: selfdriving automobiles and intelligent tractors, smartphones with amazing
capabilities, potent new drugs, cloud computing, disease-resistant crops,
medical therapies tailored to a specific individual’s genetic makeup. The
list of technological changes is impressively long and some argue that
this lends credence to futurist Ray Kurzweil’s 2001 prediction: “We won’t
experience 100 years of progress in the 21st century – it will be more
like 20,000 years of progress (at today’s rate).”5 The implication is that
technological change is going to cut a wide swath through global labor
forces in the coming decades.
Perhaps, but there are others who point out that for all of the marvelous
technological innovations that have occurred in recent years, actual
productivity increases have been disappointingly small. As George Mason
University economist Tyler Cowen put it, “Silicon Valley has not saved us
from a productivity slowdown” (The New York Times, March 4, 2016). The
fundamental economics is simple: If technological innovations do not lead
to significant increases in productivity, then this seriously diminishes their
lure. Why invest in equipment, software enhancements or AI unless such
investments are really going to make a difference?
Graph 3 reports the average annual growth in labor productivity (literally,
output per worker hour) in the United States over the past 20 years. One
can see that since 2009, labor productivity growth has stalled and now
is clearly on a lower trend line than it was in the previous decade. This

reduces the incentive for decision makers to invest in new technologies
that hold little promise of improving the firm’s bottom line.
Economic data leave little doubt that there has been a slowdown in
productivity growth that actually dates back to about 1970. Some label
this “secular stagnation,” but whatever its label, it has afflicted nearly
all mature Western economies that have not been sitting on substantial
oil deposits. Some highly reputable analysts, such as Northwestern
University’s Robert Gordon, argue that recent decades have been
characterized by a dearth of truly consequential, cost-reducing,
production-increasing innovations (“The Rise and Fall of American
Growth,” Princeton University Press, 2015).
Nevertheless, even if productivity were not declining, reality is that
a significant proportion of recent innovations have been labor-saving
in nature – apparent advances that cause firms and organizations to
substitute machines and AI for people. Consider that in 2015, the United
States produced 21.3 percent more manufactured output, but accomplished
this with 16 percent fewer workers than in 2001.6 Further, this and similar
episodes of automation often generate ripples of change throughout the
economy. As self-driving cars and trucks move into the mainstream, the
jobs of mechanics, insurance agents, car salespersons and repair shop
workers will be disrupted, and some of them no doubt will lose their jobs.
In the long run, society as a whole emerges better off and enjoys a
higher standard of living when such developments occur because these
innovations free up workers who subsequently can be employed doing
other things. Remember that in 1800, approximately 90 percent of the
labor force in the United States was involved in agriculture. Today,
less than 2 percent of our labor force is so occupied, but that 2 percent
is marvelously productive. The remaining 98 percent of the labor force
is employed doing other things that have resulted in dramatic growth
in our standard of living.7
The short-run story, however, can be painfully different. Workers

5 h
 ttp://www.kurzweilai.net/the-law-of-accelerating-returns. Kurzweil and others speak of “singularity,” a
situation in which technological change has become so rapid and so profound that it disrupts, perhaps
even destroys, human life as we know it. In this view, technological change is a double-edged sword that
simultaneously generates benefits, such as longer life spans and reduced physical drudgery, even while
it introduces significant new dangers that range from the obvious (nuclear bombs) to less-obvious AI
innovations and nanobots that are controlled by unscrupulous forces, perhaps even other, nonhuman AI
software.

displaced by technological innovations lose their jobs and subsequently
6 Old Dominion University calculations based upon U.S. Department of Commerce data and the North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
7 In the jargon of economics, such innovations push out society’s production possibilities curve and make it
possible for society to improve its standard of living.
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may find it difficult to obtain new employment. In some cases, this is
because they are not qualified for the jobs that are available – they are the
proverbial square pegs attempting to fit into round holes. Jobs exist for
welders, but steelworkers who have lost their jobs are not trained to weld.
It is these “susceptible” individuals/workers whose circumstances are
highlighted by Frey and Osborne. Not only may some of them lose
their jobs, but also their spell of unemployment could turn out to be
disappointingly long because they are not qualified to fill available
job openings. They also could be both emotionally and geographically
immobile. Or, the economy could be in the midst of recession and
employers simply don’t need additional workers. Whatever the reason,
they are the “at risk” employees in today’s economy.
While we sometimes hear alarmist rhetoric about job-destroying new
technologies, the available data do not really support this interpretation.
Graph 4 reports the absolute number of job layoffs and discharges by
month in the United States between 2000 and 2016. Immediately visible
is the upward spike in layoffs and discharges produced by the Great
Recession. Other than this, since 2011, monthly levels of layoffs and
discharges in the United States now are lower than they were at the
turn of the century. It’s not clear that changes in technology, whether
accelerating or not, have resulted in huge numbers of displaced workers
who have lost their jobs to machines, software or AI.
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Implications
When technological change occurs, it often results in some workers
losing their jobs and increased levels of economic inequality. Predictably,
labor unions and worker advocates (some political) often resist such
adjustments and demand that generous benefits be paid to those affected
and that extensive job retraining programs and educational alternatives
be offered at very low personal cost to each displaced worker. Similar
arguments are made when freely flowing international trade causes
workers to lose their jobs. One can make a credible equity case for
supplying such benefits and programs to displaced workers even though
the available economic evidence discourages the notion that there are
conspicuous skill shortages (even in STEM-related occupations)8 in
American labor markets and the rates of return realized by governments
that finance job retraining programs often are mediocre.
A dynamic, growing economy requires willingness on the part of firms
and organizations (including governments) to accept and implement

include computer coding, welding and a wide variety of tasks associated
with health care. The recent emphasis on “credentialing” may provide a
means for individuals to upgrade their qualifications and abilities without
committing themselves to entire academic degree programs.
With respect to flexibility, wherever possible, education and training
should emphasize suppleness in thinking and approach, rather than
rote memory. As Fareed Zakaria of The Washington Post (March 26,
2015) put it so succinctly, “Critical thinking is, in the end, the only way
to protect American jobs.” Occupational shortages come and go, often
in unpredictable sequences. Workers now stay with the same employer
for a median of only 4.6 years.9 The days of virtually guaranteed, steady
employment with the same firm are all but gone. Like it or not, flexibility
on the part of both employers and employees is the key to success.
With respect to mobility, wise public policy will reduce barriers that
discourage people from moving geographically and/or telecommuting to
jobs that may be located thousands of miles away.

cost-effective new methods of production and service. In response, wise

Relatively little in this domain will occur either easily or without

public policies in this arena should focus on “riding the wave” of

controversy; witness recent discussions surrounding disrupters Uber

technological change rather than encouraging resistance movements

and Lyft. What the available empirical evidence does tell us, however,

that are destined to prove futile. Astutely constructed public-private

is that the current range of public policies is insufficient to deal with

partnerships between governments and firms have the potential to

the occupational ferment that Frey and Osborne have identified. We are

develop programs designed to compensate and redirect job losers, who

forewarned.

in many cases are relatively innocent victims of dynamic economic
forces well beyond their control.
Three classes of programs commend themselves. These involve
increasing the skills, f lexibility and mobility of the workforce. With
respect to skills, policy focus should be upon proficiencies that count in
modern labor markets. This is not the same thing as generating massive
numbers of additional bachelor’s degree holders, or STEM-degree holders,
though many elected officials make this a high priority. To the surprise
of many casual observers, there is relatively little rigorous economic
evidence available that a significant shortage of job candidates exists
in STEM-related occupations. Examples of skills currently in demand
8 S
 ee Peter H. Cappelli, “Skills Gaps, Skill Shortages, and Skill Mismatches: Evidence and Arguments for the
United States,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 68 (March 2015), 251-90.

9 Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/tenure.pdf.
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